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I. Introduction
Water is the most crucial resource for virtually all aspects of human 
existence. Humans are overwhelmingly dependent on it for economic 
development, environmental survival, food security, and societal well-
being. In 1998, the United Nations identified that scarcity of fresh-
water is one of the biggest problems facing humanity. According to 
UNESCO, by 2050, two billion people will suffer from water scarcity.1 
In Somalia, water insufficiency has already reached an alarming point: 
less than 35% of the Somali people have access to clean water and 
for rural communities the number spirals to almost zero. Because of 
the water scarcity, conflicts are becoming more frequent in southern 
Somalia. Traditionally, such conflicts were socially defined and accept-
able ways of negotiating were implemented. However, many people 
in Somalia, and more commonly in the southern regions, have lately 
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turned a blind eye to the traditionally based system, and mechanisms 
of force have become the social norm. 
The term “commons” can be traced back to the Justinian code of 
530 AD, issued by the Roman emperor Justinian, which recognized 
resources, such as the air, sea, and running water, as “res communes 
omnium” (things held in common). Such resources belong to everyone 
and therefore cannot be owned by the private sector or the state. In 
1215, the English King John signed the Magna Carta and in 1217, the 
Charter of the Forest. Both documents defined, for the first time, what 
is called the commons.2 Studies of the commons emerged in the 1970s. 
The commons are a collective inheritance; they are not just resources, 
but also the rich source of relationships between ordinary people and 
communities that work together on shared purposes.
In the academic world, scholars have introduced different concepts 
that explain the problems of the commons and proposed solutions 
that can be used to solve these problems. Hardin’s 1968 concept of 
“the tragedy of the commons” asserts that the core reasons behind the 
problems of the commons are purely internal and that the solution is 
through privatization and centralization. In contrast, in 1990, Ostrom 
observed that many commons throughout the world pool resources. 
He argues that since a number of them are governed by common prop-
erty regimes, privatization would not be the solution to the problems. 
The focus of this brief article is to comment on the causes of conflict 
over the commonly owned water resources in southern Somalia. The 
aim is not to present a new approach, but rather to dissect and better 
comprehend the conceptual and contextual debates surrounding the 
topic and assess their relevance in the southern Somalia case. The first 
section reviews the internal factors and conflicts over common-pool 
resources. The second section deals with the external issues and their 
influence over the problems of the commons. The third part proposes 
methods that might help contain such conflicts and better manage the 
communally owned water resources.  
II. Inter-Group Conflicts over Common-Pool Resources
The common-pool resource concept, which refers to a communally 
owned resource, has nowadays been more generally acknowledged 
than in the past. Bromley contributes to the common-pool literature by 
defining the common property regime, which enables the owner of the 
resources to exclude non-owners from using the resources, while at the 
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same time giving co-owners rights and responsibilities with respect 
to resource use rates.3 Causes of problems in the use, governance, and 
sustainability of a commons can be said to be human behaviors that 
often lead to social dilemmas, like competition for use, freeloading, 
and overharvesting.4
According to Ostrom in 2005, a common-pool resource has two 
elements: excludability, which is associated with the difficulty of 
excluding users from appropriating a benefit from the resource; and 
subtractability, as a user appropriating benefits would reduce the avail-
ability of the resource units to other beneficiaries.5 Bodies of water, 
such as rivers and groundwater, are typical examples of common-pool 
resources. Prohibiting water users from withdrawing water is very dif-
ficult. Because a user’s withdrawal of the resource limits the chances of 
usage by others, an externality problem arises.6
Southern Somalia has in the past two decades experienced intense 
conflict over common-pool resources. Although the prime cause of 
such conflicts could be due to the changing climate, there are also 
other elements, like social and political aspects, which are also impor-
tant. Conventional solutions to the problems of the commons normally 
involve centralization or privatization of the resources. Hardin’s use of 
the tragedy of the commons concept has proved to be a useful start-
ing point for figuring out how the commons have come to the brink of 
environmental collapse. According to Hardin, commoners face a num-
ber of problems created not by malicious outside forces, but rather by 
their innocent individualistic behavior. In the case of Somalia, Hardin’s 
solution of centralized regulation and management, as well as full pri-
vate ownership of common-pool resources, is actually the cause of the 
tragedy. The conventional theory failed to predict when government 
ownership would perform appropriately and how privatization would 
improve outcomes. Ostrom, who conducted much empirical research 
of common property systems in many different parts of the world, has 
challenged Hardin’s concept. He argues that Hardin confused it with 
open access, where no rules exist to limit entry and use. Ostrom intro-
duced eight design principles that can be used to examine whether 
commoners are managing the common-pool resource effectively.7 The 
article will call upon Ostrom’s design of durable cooperative institu-
tions, organized by commoners. The design principles are as follows:
1. Defined boundaries
2. Governing resources
63
3. Collective-choice arrangements
4. Monitoring mechanisms 
5. Graduated sanctions
6. Conflict resolutions
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize 
8. Nested enterprises
The first design principle, clearly defined boundaries, requires cogent 
definition of not just the physical boundaries of the resource, but also 
precision on the type of groups that have rights over the use of the 
resources.8 Physical boundaries on resources in southern Somalia are 
often not clearly delimited because resource users come from differ-
ent parts of the country and are not limited to just the resident group. 
In addition, there is overlapping use of the same resource by different 
social and kin-based ethnic groups. 
In Somalia, the Xeer traditional legal system was used to manage the 
common-pool resources.9 Herders with their cattle and camels moved 
long distances in search of grazing land and water. Preventing migrat-
ing pastoralists from using the communally owned resources was dif-
ficult. However, this was not considered to be a problem as long as 
the newcomers did not claim ownership and as long as they gained 
permission.10 Yet because there are no clear and unambiguous rules 
about the use of water, haphazard conflicts are becoming more com-
mon. Such conflicts occur between pastoral communities, and between 
pastoral and local agriculturalist communities.11 Because of poorly 
defined boundaries in southern Somalia, the commoners are consid-
ered to be less successful in using the design principles approach.
The second principle governing resource use requires that the 
contribution of labor, money, and materials suits the local situation. 
Qaaraan, which serves as a social safety net, were collected from every 
member of the clan or resource user, and workforces were mobilized 
to better maintain the resource.12 In some parts of southern Somalia, 
like Lower Shabelle, new users of a war, an unlined dug-out dam usu-
ally two to three meters deep, are required to take out buckets of mud 
before being permitted to utilize it. This is because the bigger the war, 
the more water it can accommodate during the rainy season. Lately, 
however, people have been more determined to capture benefits from 
the commons than to fulfil their duties.13
The third principle, collective-choice arrangements, gives those with 
the right to participate power in modifying the rules.14 Shir is an infor-
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mal meeting of all the affected groups. It is where they discuss their 
opinions and concerns and is the specific stipulation of Xeer.15 In south-
ern Somalia, Xeer is not universalistic. Although there are rules that are 
common to all Somali clans, like the payment of Diya, Xeer is specific to 
the relationship between any two kin-groups. Different rules exist for 
different communities, like agriculturalists and pastoralists. 
Monitoring is the fourth design principle and helps control the 
common-pool resource appropriation. Despite the rules and user par-
ticipation in the decision-making process, there is often the tempta-
tion to cheat. Monitoring ensures the cheater will be observed and 
held accountable.16 In southern Somalia, the communally owned water 
resources are often poorly monitored.
The graduated sanctions design principle deals with the punish-
ment of violators. In southern Somalia, like other regions, an individ-
ual is insured under the law against his or her liabilities by next of kin, 
and victims are often given Diya.17
Conflict resolution mechanisms exist because even when common-
ers design and modify rules together, different interpretations may 
occur. Therefore, before disagreement threatens the functioning sys-
tem, there is a need for low cost and readily accessible arenas in which 
to mediate and reach resolution among the users.18 
Somalis have long used Xeer, which is an unwritten social contract, 
to resolve conflicts. New systems of Xeer rules were continuously 
developed to address unforeseen problems. The aggrieved group 
might favor negotiation under the auspices of a Guurti or an Ergo, 
which is a group of mediators that is often established to mediate 
between both groups without becoming personally involved in the dis-
puted subject matter. If both parties fail to reach an agreement, a jury 
known as Xeerbeegti could be established to reach a solution, and both 
parties are expected to embrace the verdict.19
To achieve Xeer, both parties must be happy with the Ergo or Xeer-
beegti members. Negotiation is also expected to take place in a neutral 
venue. Each clan, sub-kin, or sub-sub-relatives select a cohort known 
as Nabadoono (sub-kin elders) that represents the kin group when deal-
ing with others. The Nabadoono’s main task involves the management 
and supervision of the daily business matters of the kin group.20 These 
elders often deal with conflicts among various identities or negoti-
ations with other groups. However today, Xeer is poorly managed. 
Because of the introduction of sophisticated weapons of war, conflicts 
now often take days, if not weeks and months, to settle.
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The last two design principles, minimal recognition of rights to 
organize and nested enterprises, do not exist in southern Somalia. Both 
principles require external government authorities giving rights to the 
common-pool regimes, which the overthrown government denied. For 
large systems the design principles are organized into multiple layers 
of nested enterprises.21
III. Beyond the Internal Conflict over the  
Common Pool of Resources
In addition to these eight principles in the case of southern Somalia, 
one more issue needs to be examined: the external factors. Both Hardin 
and Ostrom missed considering the external elements and their influ-
ence over the problems of the commons. This is a major shortcoming. 
Hardin states that the problems of the commons are purely internal. 
He proposes privatization, which consequently proposes a neo-liberal 
Washington consensus ideology of the free market, and centralization, 
which in the case of Somalia is the actual cause of the tragedy. The core 
reasons why there has been a lack of governance over the common-
pool resources include a disorganizing colonial intervention, a later 
attempt at nationalization of the commons compounded by the violent 
overthrow of Siyad Barre’s government, and a desire to reduce the 
positive influence of the country’s kin-group tradition.22 
Throughout the colonial period, Somalia was divided into two sepa-
rate parts: the Italian region in the southern areas and the British in 
the northern territory. The Italians appointed chiefs for each kin-group 
to better manage their administrations.23 Because of the introduction 
of this system, competition among kin-groups became frequent and 
elders started competing for political appointment as a chief. The 
colonialists used this policy to weaken the integrity of the communal 
tradition and decision-making, which was crucial to governance and 
forestalling the onset of conflict.24 Moreover, the Italians introduced 
discriminatory laws that undermined the Xeer and further degraded 
the status of Somalis.25 
During the decades of the Cold War, most African countries sided 
with either the communist or the capitalist ideology. With the military 
takeover, Somalia threw in its lot with the statist ideology and intro-
duced a new framework, different from the traditionally based one, 
known as the Hantiwadag. It essentially means the common ownership 
of assets. It is a literal approximation of “scientific socialism.”26
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By October 21, 1970, General Siyad Barre had proclaimed the 
embrace of “scientific socialism” and ordained that all resources 
would be nationalized. He believed that by using this new model of 
organizing material life, the nation of nomads could be turned into 
a modern socialist state in which communities would become free of 
the liabilities of sectarian identities and move on to become citizens 
aligned with the new ideology of the state. From there, the state would 
offer more effective types of governance, leadership, greater security, 
and welfare.27 The main ideological objective of the government was 
to modernize, if not replace altogether, the Xeer and kinship systems, 
which had laid out the link between the individual and group in Soma-
lia for centuries.
There were two problems with this new model. First, the introduced 
model did not fit with Somali concepts. Here, kinship systems and 
Islamic conviction ran deep and therefore could not be easily sup-
planted. In fact, despite the governmental insistence on the elimina-
tion of the kin-based system and mentality, people still used the term 
“MOD” when referring to Barre’s government. It stands for Mariix-
aan (Barre’s kin community), Ogaadeen (Barre’s mother’s group), and 
Dhulbahantej (the community that Barre’s son-in-law hailed from).28 
For many observers, these three kin-groups were the backbone of 
the government’s inner circle. Due to the onerous implications of the 
imposed statist policies, combined with the free-for-all (Hantiwadag) 
that replaced the commons regime, commoners insisted on regaining 
their Xeer system. This is the reason for the murderous chaos that now 
bedevils the country.
The new generations that grew up under the collapsed regime had 
little knowledge of the traditions that were deployed by their ances-
tors. As a result of this void, merchants of war emerged. These groups 
use tactics of divide-and-rule among the elders to achieve their own 
malignant interests. Because of disintegration and distrust within the 
main kin relationships everywhere, smaller sub-kin started to identify 
their own leaders, which increased tensions between clans and sub-
clans. Traditionally, elders have used their powers to maintain peace 
and co-existence within the community and to resolve local problems. 
However, after the collapse of the state, elders started to mobilize their 
own kin groups to fight with “others,” and siding with their kin even if 
they were the aggressors.29
According to Dietz and colleagues, as history records, commoners 
go through a process of comedy and tragedy during upheavals. The 
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point is that issues relating to the problems of the commons do not 
necessarily lead to tragedy, but can also lead to drama with a happy 
ending.30 Before the colonial period, elders and their congeries had, to 
some degree, successfully managed to maintain the effectiveness of the 
common-pool resources by using the customary law, but have failed to 
do so recently.31 Southern Somalia has not experienced Ostrom’s drama 
of the commons model, but rather an endless series of breakdowns. 
As stated by Caffentzis, there is no logical reason why communities 
that have successfully been managing common-pool resources for gen-
erations (like water in southern Somalia before the colonial period) to 
suddenly falter even though they have, at times, managed to solve the 
coordination problems.32 Ostrom’s perspective fails to include within 
the eight design principles external factors that can be the causes of 
conflagration. In Somalia, the external factors of colonialism, “scien-
tific socialism,” and civil war weakened the functionality of Xeer and 
common-pool assets. 
IV. Managing Tragedies
There is no blueprint solution to the water problems in southern Soma-
lia. However, understanding links between external and internal is 
crucially important. These reflections recommend further research on 
an external-internal approach that combines the eight design princi-
ples with external factors, such as the civil war, so as to achieve a more 
effective and collective management system. 
Based on the preliminary explorations, the Rowland-Ostrom Frame-
work, which provides two-step solutions to resource management 
problems, is relevant to this particular outlined problem. The first step 
of the framework deals with the identification of the problem that 
threatens both the resource and the users. This examination identifies 
the water crisis in southern Somalia as a state of acute urgency. The 
most difficult issue with the first point is for the commoners of the 
common-pool resources to acknowledge that a crisis situation exists. 
After such a recognition, commoners could work toward reaching an 
agreement so as to better sustain the resource for their mutual ben-
efit.33 There is little doubt, then, that the water crisis in southern Soma-
lia is interconnected with droughts, civil war, and the lack of effective 
management.
With respect to the supervision of common-pool resources, resi-
dent users often possess inadequate scientific knowledge to com-
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plement their own indigenous knowledge. Reliable information on 
water conditions and the effects of water use patterns are important 
for the long-term management of common-pool resources.34 The cur-
rent government can help local users by conducting environmental 
assessments of water use patterns and identifying areas that are being 
degraded or at risk, while also providing training to the local commu-
nities in improved management techniques. The current government 
has an important role to play in resolving disputes, reconciling the 
different user groups, monitoring the implementation of resource use 
agreements by providing a legal framework worked out by different 
local groups, providing technical and management support for local 
communities, and carrying out environmental assessments. Consid-
ering these various issues, it can be clearly said that the state has a 
continuing and facilitative role to play in the management of common-
pool resources.35
The second step of the Rowland-Ostrom Framework requires tran-
sitioning from the existing water management system to a protocol 
using a common-pool resource system, which follows from Ostrom’s 
eight principles. Once a common-pool resource management system is 
in place, water disputes can be prevented more successfully.36 In order 
to address southern Somalia’s unprecedented water crisis, Somalia 
desperately needs to find long-lasting solutions to the ongoing politi-
cal conflict. Without dealing with the external factors, which both Har-
din and Ostrom failed to acknowledge, an effective water management 
system cannot be implemented. The argument is that in the case of 
southern Somalia, both external and internal factors are interdepen-
dent.
Apart from the government acting as a facilitator, social charters 
can be used as a mechanism for governing the commons. They specify 
the groups that have access to the resource, control over the use of the 
resource, and, if there are fees, how the wealth and costs are distributed 
among the group.37 Therefore, each community creates social charters, 
rather than leaving all the responsibilities for the state bureaucracy. 
This would create common trust, which ensures the health and well-
being of the communal assets for generations to come. 
This assessment acknowledges that the external-internal approach 
is not the only way to address water use issues in southern Somalia. 
Though one specific approach cannot be a panacea to better manage 
problems over the use of water, examining the effect of a specific com-
bination of tools is wise in order to prevent harmful consequences.
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V. Conclusion
In Somalia, water scarcity has been brewing for some time and has 
reached an alarming point, severely impacting the country’s social, 
economic, political, and environmental well-being, and leading to 
ongoing conflicts among commoners. Traditionally, conflicts over 
common-pool resources were socially defined and acceptable ways of 
negotiating were implemented. Lately, however, people have turned 
a blind eye to the traditionally based system, and force has become 
the social norm. This is because of the colonial anti-customary-law 
movement and the late Barre’s governmental nationalization of the 
communally owned range, which negated the laws devised by com-
munities. Droughts, the growing demand for basic resources, political 
conflicts and civil war, and mismanagement have, combined, esca-
lated hostilities and subsequent conflicts. While prominent scholars 
have long interrogated such disputes and provided good models, their 
studies lack an appreciation of the impact of decisive external factors 
that, in the case of southern Somalia, had fuelled the problems that are 
destroying common-pool resources. Thus, further work on this point is 
now necessary. As for the current authorities in Mogadishu, an attempt 
to minimize the destabilization of the country and Xeer-cum-kinship 
systems might prove to be worthy of serious effort. In this context, the 
state can act as a facilitator in the revival and monitoring of resource-
use agreements reached by different local groups. Rather than the 
failed policy of tight centralization, commoners could now be empow-
ered to be creative in establishing durable trust and fairness that could 
preempt possible disharmonies among communities. This is a drasti-
cally different future for the coming generations than the bloody mess 
of the past five decades.
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